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LUNCHEON
EXCLUSIVE WORK JURISDICTION CLAUSES

IN AIRLINE CONTRACTS
By

TERRELL S. SHRADERt

W

HILE THERE are many issues in current collective bargaining, the
one with which Braniff has been most concerned is the continual
pressure by the unions for a reduction in productive hours worked, coupled
with demands for excessive increases in pay and direct cost benefits. Of
paramount concern is the economic impact on both labor contract rules
that credit an employee for time not worked and exclusive work jurisdiction clauses.
It will be beneficial to describe the general makeup of the operating costs
implicit in the airline industry. The figures I cite are those applicable to
Braniff and may vary slightly with other carriers; however, for our purposes they may be considered representative of all carriers. Of each dollar
spent, 35 percent is attributable to employee costs. This figure provides
vivid contrast with certain manufacturing concerns where employee costs
represent only 20 percent or less of the total operating expenditures.
Why is this discrepancy so, and why is it important to our discussion?
It's so because of the nature of the air transportation business. Airlines sell
only transportation services in accordance with a previously determined
schedule; there are no products on the shelves or stock piles of inventory
which can be mass produced for dispensing at a later date as demand requires. From the airline's point of view, the act of production is also the
act of dispensing. A 150-seat airplane leaving point A for point B at 8:30
produces 150 seats at 8:30 and dispenses 150 seats at the same time. Those
seats not filled are lost; they become nonsaleable with the flight. Thus, this
product is probably more perishable than that of any other industry. Airplanes represent only potential products. It takes numerous employees to
actually produce the real product-the passenger seat.
High employee cost as a percent of total expense is important to our
discussion because of the excessive impact which results from applying
percentage wage or benefit increases to the already high base which
employee costs represent to the airlines. For example, assume that manufacturing plant A has a total operating expense of $300 million of which
20 percent, or $60 million, represents employee costs. Assume further
that this manufacturing company settles a union negotiation for six
percent additional costs. The actual dollar increase will be $3.6 million.
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Applying that same set of figures to an airline whose total operating
costs are also $300 million, the employee costs would represent 35 percent of the total, or $105 million. Increase that figure by the same six
percent union settlement and the astounding result is a $.3 million increase, which is a 72 percent greater increase in dollar cost than that
applicable to the manufacturing company. A similar result occurs in settlements that give employees additional time off with pay, such as added
vacations, holidays, sick leave and so forth.
There exists one additional aspect of this dilemma that the airlines face
at the bargaining table. There is a total civilian work force in the United
States of 79.5 million employees as contrasted with only 300,000 employees
in the entire airline industry. Therefore, it seems logical that "break
through" or settlement patterns would be established by industries other
than the airlines. Thus, those on whom the economic impact will be least
are setting the trends. The steel, automotive or aerospace industries establish a pattern usually expressed as a percentage which, with a little frosting
on top, immediately become the objectives of the unions in airline settlements. The foregoing points suggest the position in which the airlines approach the bargaining table. Even though it is of great concern, I will
intentionally omit discussion of wages as a current issue because beyond
the definition of wages the only element left to discuss is amount. At this
point I want to focus on what seems to be a basic trend once again receiving direction from the unions in the current round of negotiations. This
trend, and the philosophy behind it, is best defined by the rule under which
an employee may receive work time credit for time not worked.
Some of the current demands are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Increased vacations
More holidays off with pay
Pay and credit for the normal meal period
Longer coffee breaks-morning and afternoon
Shorter work days at full pay
Longer time off with pay when a death or serious illness occurs in the
family (with an expanded definition of "the family")

7. Automatic time off with pay for unused sick leave
8. Tightening of jurisdictional scope rules so that employees may perform
only specified work, resulting in extra employees while others have little
or nothing to do and receive full-time work credit

9. Tightening the rules by which pilots get flight-time credit for time not
flown.

Of these, I will discuss only one-the continual tightening of work jurisdiction and scope rules. Under the Railway Labor Act, which governs labor
relations in the airline industry, employees have a right to organize and
bargain collectively with the carrier. The act further states that a "majority
of any craft or class . . . shall have the right to determine who shall be

the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act."' The
National Mediation Board is the administrative agency which is given broad
'Railway
(1964).

Labor Act, § 2, Fourth, 44 Stat. 577 (1926),

as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151(a),

152

1969]

AIR TRANSPORT LABOR SYMPOSIUM

discretionary powers in determining the rules to be applied in handling an
application for representation.
In the exercise of its discretionary power, the Board has consistently
followed a course of restricting representation elections to specified classes
and crafts of employees. Thus, all the employees in the "pilot" classification
with a carrier are deemed to be within a single craft and class, and, accordingly, they may elect a representative. Therefore, the pilots of a company at station A could not elect a representative (for purpose of the Act)
other than the representative of the pilots at other stations. Thus, an "all
or nothing proposition" with respect to a class and craft has been defined
by the Board.
Historically, the Board has developed certain criteria to be applied in
determining the boundaries of a class or craft. I will not discuss all of
them; however, I do want to mention one rule which has a bearing on the
issue of scope and work jurisdiction. Under the rule, referred to as the
"majority of work" rule, Ramp Service employees who spend most of their
time performing Ramp Service duties are included in the craft or class
covering Ramp Service employees for representation purposes. Accordingly,
they have a right to vote on, and will be covered by, an ensuing agreement.
At this point no great problem exists. However, the remainder of the Ramp
Service man's time is spent performing duties which are designated in the
class and craft of Clerical and Office personnel. If this latter group is not
itself represented by a union, there is still no great problem. However,
assume both group are represented and, moreover, by different unions. At
this point the jurisdictional problem begins. Initial difficulty begins during
the election itself, which determines within a more or less integral group
which specific employees are deemed to be in one craft or class and which
in the other. The solution to this problem rests in the application of the
"majority of work" rule which, in turn, creates a base for the continual
fomenting of pressure moves by the opposing unions. The company is
left in the middle of this dispute.
Understanding how these pressures are brought to bear on the company requires a realization that the entire group functions operationally as
a unit necessitating the cross assignment of personnel. In turn, this cross
assignment results in administrative disputes, grievances and pay claims.
Next, the issue is brought to the bargaining table in the form of a demand
that the company agree to describe certain duties as belonging exclusively
to the group "normally" performing these duties. However, what is normal
varies from station to station. Unfortunately, where the union has greater
bargaining power, concessions have been extracted. As is to be expected,
pressures build because success seems to feed the appetite. Thus, more recent demands have attempted to extend the application of intra-company
exclusive-work jurisdictional clauses to prevent the company from obtraining services from other companies where such services involve work
normally included in the job description of a covered position, even though
such services can be obtained more economically. "No farm out of work"
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clauses then become the emotional issues. The most immediate and direct
result is that the company must necessarily hire more employees to perform
the work than is required under good administrative practices. The ultimate result is more employees at greater cost to the company but with no
direct benefit to the employees. Of course, an indirect benefit to the union
is implicit since more employees equal more potential members.
The solution to the above problems can be summed up in two wordseducation and maturity. Both employees and their representatives must
understand that burdensome, costly contract rules which do not directly
benefit the employee's pay check and which do not produce a comparable
benefit to the employer can only defeat the objective of security which is
sought. Business failures, with the terrific personal loss to the employees and
stockholders alike, are possible and probable unless reasoning and understanding overtake this current trend. In a young and vigorous industry,
such as the airline industry, financial stability and growth produce the only
lasting security. Maturity must be coupled with the knowledge of the impact and probable results that irresponsible actions by either party can
produce. The "guts" to act firmly and affirmatively are necessary.

